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Abstract
A discrete memoryless generalized multiple access channel (GMAC) with confiden-
tial messages is studied, where two users attempt to transmit common information
to a destination and each user also has private (confidential) information intended for
the destination. This channel generalizes the multiple access channel (MAC) in that
the two users also receive channel outputs, and hence may obtain the confidential in-
formation sent by each other from channel outputs they receive. However, each user
views the other user as a wire-tapper, and wishes to keep its confidential informa-
tion as secret as possible from the other user. The level of secrecy of the confidential
information is measured by the equivocation rate, i.e., the entropy rate of the confiden-
tial information conditioned on channel outputs at the wire-tapper. The performance
measure of interest for the GMAC with confidential messages is the rate-equivocation
tuple that includes the common rate, two private rates and two equivocation rates
as components. The set that includes all these achievable rate-equivocation tuples is
referred to as the capacity-equivocation region. For the GMAC with one confidential
message set, where only one user (user 1) has private (confidential) information for the
destination, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are derived.
These bounds match partially, and hence the capacity-equivocation region is partially
characterized. Furthermore, the outer bound provides a tight converse to the secrecy
capacity region, which is the set of all achievable rates with user 2 being perfectly igno-
rant of confidential messages of user 1, thus establishing the secrecy capacity region. A
class of degraded GMACs with one confidential message set is further studied, and the
capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region are established. These
capacity results are further explored via two example degraded channels: the binary
GMAC and the Gaussian GMAC. For both channels, the capacity-equivocation regions
are obtained. In particular, the capacity-equivocation region of the degraded Gaus-
sian GMAC is shown to apply to non-physically-degraded Gaussian channels as well.
For the GMAC with two confidential message sets, where both users have confidential
messages for the destination, an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is
obtained. The secrecy rate region is derived, where each user’s confidential informa-
tion is perfectly hidden from the other user. It is demonstrated that for the case of
two confidential message sets there is a trade-off between the two equivocation rates
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corresponding to the two confidential message sets, and this trade-off can be achieved
by using codebooks that achieve different boundary points of the corresponding MAC.
1 Introduction
Two important issues in communications are reliability and security. The reliability quan-
tifies the maximum achievable rate (capacity) with small probability of error, and has been
studied intensively since Shannon theory was established [1]. Security is an important issue
when the transmitted information is confidential and needs to be kept as secret as possible
from wire-tappers or eavesdroppers. The level of secrecy of confidential information at a
wire-tapper can be measured by the equivocation rate, i.e., the entropy rate of confidential
messages conditioned on channel outputs at the wire-tapper. If both reliability and security
are considered, the performance measure of interest is the rate-equivocation tuple that in-
cludes both the communication rates and the equivocation rates (achieved at wire-tappers)
as components. We refer to the set that consists of all achievable rate-equivocation tuples
as the capacity-equivocation region.
Communication of confidential messages has been studied in the literature for some classes
of channels. The wire-tap channel was introduced by Wyner in [2], where a sender wishes
to transmit information to a legitimate receiver and to keep a wire-tapper as ignorant of
this information as possible. The channel from the sender to the legitimate receiver and the
wire-tapper was assumed to be a degraded broadcast channel. The trade-off between the
communication rate to the legitimate receiver and the level of ignorance at the wire-tapper
was developed. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity was established, at which the information
source can be reliably reconstructed at the legitimate receiver with the wire-tapper being
perfectly ignorant of the information source.
The broadcast channel with confidential messages was studied in [3] as a generalization
of the wire-tap channel, where the sender also wishes to transmit common information to
both the legitimate receiver and the wire-tapper in addition to the private (confidential)
information to the legitimate receiver. Moreover, the broadcast channel from the sender
to the two receivers was assumed to be general and may not be degraded. The capacity-
equivocation region was established for this channel, and the secrecy capacity region was
given. The relay channel with confidential messages was studied in [4], where the relay node
acts as both a helper and a wire-tapper. Some other related studies on communication of
confidential messages can be found in [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
In this paper, we consider a two-user generalized multiple access channel (GMAC) with
confidential messages, which generalizes the multiple access channel (MAC) [15, Sec. 14.3]
by allowing both users to receive noisy channel outputs. This channel model is motivated
by wireless communications, where transmitted signals are broadcast over open media and
can be received by all nodes within communication range. For this channel, we assume
that two users (users 1 and 2) have common information and each user has its private
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(confidential) information intended for a destination. Since two users also receive channel
outputs, they may extract each other’s confidential information from their received channel
outputs. However, each user treats the other user as a wire-tapper, and wishes to keep this
wire-tapper as ignorant of its confidential message as possible. The level of ignorance of one
user’s confidential message at the other user (wire-tapper) is measured by the equivocation
rate. Our goal is to study the capacity-equivocation region of the GMAC with confidential
messages.
We first study the GMAC with one confidential message set, where two users have common
information for the destination and only one user (user 1) has private (confidential) informa-
tion for the destination. This channel generalizes the MAC with degraded message sets [16]
with the further assumption that user 2 receives channel outputs and user 1 wants to keep
user 2 as ignorant of its confidential information as possible. This model is also a counter-
part of the broadcast channel with confidential messages studied in [3]. For the GMAC with
one confidential message set, we obtain inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation
region. The two bounds match partially and determine the capacity-equivocation region par-
tially. Furthermore, the outer bound provides a tight converse to the secrecy capacity region,
which is the set of all achievable rates with user 2 being perfectly ignorant of confidential
messages of user 1, and we hence establish the secrecy capacity region.
We further study the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set, where outputs
at user 2 are degraded versions of outputs at the destination. This model generalizes the
wire-tap channel [2] to allow user 1 and user 2 (the wire-tapper) to send common infor-
mation to the destination. For the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set,
we show a tight converse and establish the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy
capacity region. Moreover, we study these capacity results via two classes of degraded
channels: the binary GMAC and the Gaussian GMAC. For both channels, we characterize
the capacity-equivocation regions and secrecy capacity regions explicitly. In particular, for
the Gaussian GMAC, we show that the capacity-equivocation region also applies to non-
physically-degraded Gaussian channels.
We finally study the general case of the GMAC with two confidential message sets, where
both users have confidential messages for the destination in addition to common messages.
We obtain an achievable rate-equivocation region (inner bound on the capacity-equivocation
region). We demonstrate a trade-off between the two equivocation rates corresponding to the
two set of confidential messages sent by user 1 and user 2, and this trade-off can be achieved
by using codebooks that achieve different boundary points of the corresponding MAC. This
trade-off is a new feature that arises in the case with two confidential message sets. Based on
the rate-equivocation region, we derive the secrecy rate region, where confidential messages
of each user is perfectly secret from the other user.
In this paper, we adopt the following notation. We use upper case letters to indicate ran-
dom variables, and we use lower case letters to indicate deterministic variables or realizations
of the corresponding random variables. Exceptions will be clarified where they appear in
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the paper. We use xn to indicate the vector (x1, . . . , xn), and use x
n
i to indicate the vector
(xi, . . . , xn). Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the channel model of
the GMAC with confidential messages. In Section 3, we present our results for the GMAC
with one confidential message set. In Section 4, we present our results for the degraded
GMAC with one confidential message set and illustrate our results by a binary example
channel. In Section 5, we focus on the Gaussian GMAC with one confidential message set.
In Section 6, we present our results for the general case of the GMAC with two confidential
message sets, and illustrate the intuition behind the result. In the final section, we give
concluding remarks.
2 Channel Model
In this section, we first define the GMAC, and then define the performance measure of
interest for the GMAC with confidential messages.
Definition 1. A discrete memoryless GMAC consists of two finite channel input alphabets
X1 and X2, three finite channel output alphabets Y ,Y1 and Y2, and a transition probability
distribution p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2) (see Fig. 1), where x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2 are channel inputs
from users 1 and 2, respectively, and y ∈ Y , y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2 are channel outputs at the
destination, user 1 and user 2, respectively.
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Figure 1: Generalized multiple access channel
For generality, we assume that each user receives channel outputs that also depend on its
own inputs. This assumption is also practical since transmitted signals from one user may
cause interference at its own receiver. All results that we obtain apply to the case where
outputs at either user do not depend on its own inputs.
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Definition 2. A
(
2nR0, 2nR1, 2nR2 , n
)
code for the GMAC consists of the following:
• Three message sets: W0 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR0},W1 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} andW2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2}.
The common message W0 and private messages W1 and W2 are independent and uni-
formly distributed over the message sets W0,W1 and W2, respectively.
• Two (stochastic) encoders, one at user 1: W0 ×W1 → X n1 , which maps each message
pair (w0, w1) ∈ W0 ×W1 to a codeword xn1 ∈ X n1 ; the other at user 2: W0 ×W2 → X n2 ,
which maps each message pair (w0, w2) ∈ W0 ×W2 to a codeword xn2 ∈ X n2 ;
• One decoder at the destination: Yn →W0×W1×W2, which maps a received sequence
yn to a message tuple (w0, w1, w2) ∈ W0 ×W1 ×W2.
Note that in the GMAC although users 1 and 2 can receive channel outputs (see Fig. 1),
they are only passive listeners in that their encoding functions are not affected by these
received outputs. However, since outputs at each user contain the other user’s private (con-
fidential) information, each user may extract the other user’s private (confidential) informa-
tion from its outputs. We assume that each user treats the other user as a wire-tapper, and
wishes to keep the other user as ignorant of its private (confidential) messages as possible.
We hence define the following two equivocation rates:
at user 2:
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0,W2)
at user 1:
1
n
H(W2|Y n1 , Xn1 ,W0,W1)
(1)
which indicate the level of ignorance of the confidential message W1 at user 2 and the level
of ignorance of the confidential message W2 at user 1, respectively. Note that the larger the
equivocation rate, the higher the level of secrecy.
For the GMAC with confidential messages, a rate-equivocation tuple (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e)
is achievable if there exists a sequence of
(
2nR0, 2nR1, 2nR2, n
)
codes with the average error
probability P
(n)
e → 0 as n goes to infinity and with the equivocation rates R1,e and R2,e
satisfying
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0,W2) ≥ R1,e
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W2|Y n1 , Xn1 ,W0,W1) ≥ R2,e.
(2)
Note that the rate-equivocation tuple (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e) includes both the reliable com-
munication rates and the equivocation rates, and it indicates the common and private rates
(R0, R1, R2) achieved at certain levels of communication secrecy (R1,e, R2,e) .
The capacity-equivocation region, denoted by C , is the closure of the set that consists
of all achievable rate-equivocation tuples (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e). Our goal is to study the
capacity-equivocation region of the GMAC with confidential messages.
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3 GMAC with One Confidential Message Set
In this section, we study the GMAC with one confidential message set, where user 2 has
only common messages and does not have confidential messages for the destination. This
model generalizes the MAC with degraded message sets studied in [16] to consider the private
messages sent from user 1 to be confidential, i.e., needing to be as secret as possible from
user 2. This model is also a counterpart of the broadcast channel with confidential messages
studied in [3].
In the following, we first provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation
region. We then present the secrecy capacity region, which includes all rates at which
perfect secrecy can be achieved for private (confidential) messages sent by user 1. We finally
give a proof of the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region.
3.1 Main Results
For the GMAC with one confidential message set, the rate R2 = 0, and the equivocation rate
R2,e is not of interest. Hence channel outputs at user 1 do not play roles in the analysis. For
notational convenience, we use Re to indicate R1,e in this case. Now the rate-equivocation
tuple becomes (R0, R1, Re); i.e., it contains three components. We use C
I to denote the
capacity-equivocation region of the GMAC in this situation.
The following two theorems provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation
region.
Theorem 1. The following convexified region is an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation
region for the GMAC with one confidential message set:
R
I = Convex
⋃
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)
p(y, y2|x1, x2)


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,X2, Q; Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ [I(U ; Y |X2, Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q)]+,
Re ≤ [I(U,X2, Q; Y )− R0 − I(U ; Y2|X2, Q)]+


.
(3)
where the function [x]+ = x if x ≥ 0 and [x]+ = 0 if x < 0. The auxiliary random variables Q
and U are bounded in cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1|·|X2|+3 and |U| ≤ |X1|2 ·|X2|2+4|X1|·|X2|+3,
respectively.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the achievable rate-equivocation region for the GMAC
with two confidential message sets given in Theorem 7 in Section 6. This can be seen by
setting R2 = 0, R2,e = 0, and V := X2, and combining (75) with (80).
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Remark 1. The last bound in (3) indicates that there is a trade-off between the common
rate and the secrecy level of confidential messages. As common rate R0 increases, the secrecy
level of confidential messages may get lower.
Remark 2. The rate-equivocation region (3) reduces to the capacity region of the MAC with
degraded message sets given in [16] by setting U = X1 and Re = 0.
Theorem 2. The following region is an outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region of
the GMAC with one confidential message set:
R
I
=
⋃
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)
p(v|q)p(y, y2|x1, x2)


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |X2, V ),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,X2, Q; Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ I(U ; Y |X2, Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +Re ≤ I(U,X2, Q; Y )− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q)


. (4)
The proof of Theorem 2 is relegated to Section 3.3. In the following, we focus on the
properties that the inner and outer bounds imply.
Remark 3. The last four bounds in the outer bound (4) match the last four bounds in the
inner bound (3), and hence these four common bounds partially determine the boundary of
the capacity-equivocation region.
We now study the case where perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., user 2 does not get any
information about confidential messages that user 1 sends to the destination. This happens
if Re = R1.
Definition 3. The secrecy capacity region CIs is the region that includes all achievable rate
pairs (R0, R1) such that Re = R1, i.e.,
CIs = {(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, R1) ∈ C I}. (5)
Definition 4. For a given rate R0, the secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable rate R1
with confidential messages perfectly hidden from user 2, i.e.,
CIs (R0) = max
(R0,R1)∈CIs
R1. (6)
Although the outer bound given in Theorem 2 provides only a partial converse to the
capacity-equivocation region, it is sufficiently tight to serve as the converse to the secrecy
capacity region and secrecy capacity (as a function of the common rate R0).
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Theorem 3. For the GMAC with one confidential message set, the following region is the
secrecy capacity region :
CIs =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)
p(y, y2|x1, x2)


(R0, R1) :
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |X2, Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,X2, Q; Y )− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q)

 . (7)
The secrecy capacity for a given rate R0 is given by
CIs (R0) = maxmin{I(U ; Y |X2, Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q),
I(U,X2, Q; Y )− I(U ; Y2|X2, Q)− R0}
(8)
where the maximum is taken over all joint distributions p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(y, y2|x1, x2).
In both (7) and (8), the auxiliary random variables Q and U are bounded in cardinality by
|Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 3 and |U| ≤ |X1|2 · |X2|2 + 4|X1| · |X2|+ 3, respectively.
Proof. The achievability of CIs follows from the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation
region given in Theorem 1, and the converse follows from the last two bounds in the outer
bound given in Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity CIs (R0) then easily follows from the secrecy
capacity region CIs .
Remark 4. If we let R0 = 0 and X2 := φ, the GMAC with one confidential message set
reduces to the case of a broadcast channel with confidential messages studied in [3] with the
common rate being zero. For this channel, the secrecy capacity in (8) reduces to
CIs = max[I(U ; Y )− I(U ; Y2)] (9)
where the max is taken over all joint distribution p(u, x1)p(y, y2|x1). This is the same as the
secrecy capacity given in Corollary 2 in [3].
3.2 An Example
In this section, we consider an example of a discrete memoryless GMAC with one confidential
message set. We obtain the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region for
this channel.
Consider a binary channel with all channel inputs and outputs having alphabets {0, 1}.
The MAC from two users to the destination is a binary multiplier channel, and the channel
from user 1 to user 2 is a bias channel. The channel input-output relationship (see Fig. 2)
satisfies
Y = X1 ·X2, Y2 =
{
1, if X1 ≤ X2;
0, if X1 > X2.
(10)
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Figure 2: An example GMAC
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Figure 3: Capacity region of binary multiplier MAC
The capacity-equivocation region of the example channel given in (10) is:
{(R0, R1, Re) : R0 +R1 ≤ 1, Re = R1}. (11)
The capacity-equivocation region implies that the secrecy capacity region of this channel is:
{(R0, R1) : R0 +R1 ≤ 1}. (12)
It is shown in [17] that the region {(R0, R1) : R0 + R1 ≤ 1} (see Fig. 3) is the capacity
region of the binary multiplier MAC. We now show that perfect secrecy can be achieved for
the two corner points of this region. It is trivial that perfect secrecy can be achieved for the
corner point (R0 = 1, R1 = 0), i.e., Re = 0 is achievable at this point. For the other corner
point (R0 = 0, R1 = 1), perfect secrecy is achieved by sending (x1 = 0, x2 = 1) for W1 = 0
and (x1 = 1, x2 = 1) for W1 = 1. When either of these two codewords is transmitted, user 2
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always gets output Y2 = 1, and hence cannot determine whether W1 = 0 or W1 = 1 is sent.
Therefore, perfect secrecy is achieved. By time-sharing between these two corner points,
perfect secrecy can be achieved for the entire region, which is the best rate-equivocation
region that can be achieved. Hence we obtain the capacity-equivocation region (11).
Remark 5. The example channel given in (10) is a nondegraded channel. We hence obtain
the capacity-equivocation region for a nondegraded channel.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we give a proof of the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region in
Theorem 2. The proof applies the techniques in the proofs of the converse of the capacity-
equivocation region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages in [3] and the con-
verse of the capacity region of the MAC [15, Chapter 14].
We consider a sequence of
(
2nR0 , 2nR1, n
)
codes for a GMAC with one confidential message
set with P
(n)
e → 0. Then the probability distribution on W0 ×W1 ×X n1 × X n2 × Yn × Yn2 is
given by
p(w0, w1, x
n
1 , x
n
2 , y
n, yn2 )
= p(w0)p(w1)p(x
n
1 |w0, w1)p(xn2 |w0)
n∏
i=1
p(yi, y2,i|x1,i, x2,i). (13)
By Fano’s Inequality, we have
H(W0,W1|Y n) ≤ n(R0 +R1)P (n)e + 1 := nδn (14)
where δn → 0 if P (n)e → 0.
We first give a lemma that is useful in the following proof.
Lemma 1. [3, Lemma 7]
n∑
i=1
I(Zi; Y
i−1|Zni+1, T ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
n
i+1|Y i−1, T ).
We define the following auxiliary random variables.
Qi := (Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1, X
n
2 ,W0), Ui := (W1, Qi), Vi := (Y
i−1, Xn2 ,W0) (15)
Note that these auxiliary random variables satisfy the following Markov chain conditions:
X2,i → Qi → Ui → X1,i,
Vi → Qi → (Ui, X1,i, X2,i)
(Vi, Qi, Ui)→ (X1,i, X2,i)→ (Yi, Y2,i)
(16)
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We first consider
nR1,e ≤ H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)
= H(W1|Xn2 ,W0)− I(W1; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
= I(W1; Y
n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(W1; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(W1|Y n, Xn2 ,W0)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)− I(Y n2,i+1; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0,W1)
− I(W1, Y i−1; Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0) + I(Y i−1; Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0,W1) + nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)− I(W1, Y i−1; Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0) + I(W1; Yi|Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0)
− I(Y i−1; Y2,i|Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Yi|Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Yi|X2,i, Qi)− I(Ui; Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
(17)
In the preceding equation, (a) follows from the chain rule and Fano’s inequality (14), (b) and
(c) follows from Lemma 1, and (d) follows from the definition for Qi and Ui in (15).
We also can write
nR0 + nR1,e
≤ H(W0) +H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)
≤ I(W0; Y n) +H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0; Yi|Y i−1) +H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, X
n
2 ,W0; Yi) +H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Qi, X2,i; Yi) + I(Ui; Yi|X2,i, Qi)− I(Ui; Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i, Qi, Ui; Yi)− I(Ui; Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
(18)
In the preceding equation, (a) follows from the chain rule and nonnegativity of mutual
information, and (b) follows from the definition for Qi in (15) and the bound (17).
11
We further have
nR1 = H(W1) ≤ I(W1; Y n) + nδn ≤ I(W1; Y n|W0) + nδn
= H(W1|W0)−H(W1|Y n,W0) + nδn
(a)
≤ H(W1|W0, Xn2 )−H(W1|Y n,W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
= I(W1; Y
n|W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Yi|Y i−1,W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, X
n
2 ,W0,W1; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Yi|X2,i, Vi) + nδn
(19)
where (a) follows from the fact that W1 is independent of (W0, X
n
2 ) and conditioning does
not increase entropy.
Finally, we have
nR0 + nR1 = H(W0,W1) ≤ I(W0,W1; Y n) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1; Yi|Y i−1) + nδn
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1, Y n2,i+1, X
n
2 ,W0,W1; Yi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui, Qi, X2,i; Yi) + nδn
(20)
where (a) follows from the chain rule and nonnegativity of mutual information. Theorem 2
then follows from standard single letter characterization (see e.g. [15]).
4 Degraded GMAC with One Confidential Message
Set
In this section, we study the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set, where
the output at user 2 is a degraded version of the output at the destination. This channel
generalizes the wire-tap channel studied in [2] to allow user 1 and user 2 (wire-tapper)
to jointly send common information to the destination. In the following, we first present
the main results that characterize the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity
region of the degraded channel, and provide the proof for the main results. We then illustrate
our results via a binary example GMAC.
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4.1 Main Results
We first define two classes of degraded GMACs with one confidential message set in the
following.
Definition 5. The GMAC with one confidential message set is physically degraded if the
transition probability distribution satisfies
p(y, y2|x1, x2) = p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2), (21)
i.e., y2 is independent of x1 conditioned on y and x2.
Definition 6. The GMAC with one confidential message set is stochastically degraded if its
conditional marginal distribution is the same as that of a physically degraded GMAC, i.e.,
there exists a distribution p(y2|y, x2) such that
p(y2|x1, x2) =
∑
y
p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2). (22)
We note the following useful lemma.
Lemma 2. The capacity-equivocation region of GMACs with confidential messages depends
only on the marginal channel transition probability distributions p(y|x1, x2), p(y1|x1, x2), and
p(y2|x1, x2).
Proof. It is clear that the decoding probability of error at the destination depends only on
the probability distribution p(y|x1, x2), and so is the achievable rates (R0, R1, R2). Moreover,
the equivocation rates R1,e and R2,e depend only on the probability distributions p(y1|x1, x2)
and p(y2|x1, x2), respectively.
Based on Lemma 2, we have the following capacity-equivocation region for both physically
and stochastically degraded GMACs with confidential messages.
Theorem 4. For the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set, the capacity-
equivocation region is given by
C
I
d =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(x1|q)
p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2)


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +Re ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)


. (23)
where Q is bounded in cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 1.
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The achievability is obtained by applying Theorem 1 and setting U = X1 in (3). The proof
of the converse is provided in the next subsection.
Remark 6. The region C Id can be shown to be convex (similar to the proof of Lemma 5 in
[3]), and hence does not need further convexification.
The following results on the secrecy capacity region and secrecy capacity (as a function of
R0) follow from Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. For the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set, the secrecy capacity
region is given by
Cs =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(x1|q)
p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2)


(R0, R1) :
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)

 . (24)
The secrecy capacity as a function of R0 is given by
Cs(R0) = maxmin{I(X1; Y |X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q),
I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)− R0}
(25)
where the maximum is taken over all joint distributions p(q, x2)p(x1|q)p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2).
In both (24) and (25), Q is bounded in cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 1.
Remark 7. If R0 = 0 and X2 := φ, the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set
reduces to the wire-tap channel studied in [2]. For this channel, the secrecy capacity in (24)
reduces to
Cs = max[I(X1; Y )− I(X1; Y2)] (26)
where the max is taken over all joint distribution p(x1)p(y|x1)p(y2|y). This is consistent with
the secrecy capacity given in [2] with a different form, because the problem in [2] is formulated
as a source-channel problem. The secrecy capacity in (26) is also consistent with the secrecy
capacity of the less noisy channel given in [3, Theorem 3], because degraded channels belong
to the class of less noisy channels [18].
4.2 Proof of the Converse for Theorem 4
For the general discrete memoryless GMAC with one confidential message set, we give a
proof of the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region in Section 3.3. This outer
bound provides only a partial converse. In this section, we apply the degradedness condition
and prove a tight converse to the capacity-equivocation region for the degraded GMAC with
one confidential message set.
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Our proof applies the techniques in the converse proofs for the wire-tap channel in [2] and
for the MAC in [15, Chapter 14].
We consider a sequence of
(
2nR0, 2nR1, n
)
codes for the GMAC with one confidential mes-
sage set with P
(n)
e → 0. Then the probability distribution on W0×W1×X n1 ×X n2 ×Yn×Yn2
is given by
p(w0, w1, x
n
1 , x
n
2 , y
n, yn2 )
= p(w0)p(w1)p(x
n
1 |w0, w1)p(xn2 |w0)
n∏
i=1
p(yi, y2,i|x1,i, x2,i)
= p(w0)p(w1)p(x
n
1 |w0, w1)p(xn2 |w0)
n∏
i=1
p(yi|x1,i, x2,i)p(y2,i|yi, x2,i).
(27)
By Fano’s inequality, we have
H(W0,W1|Y n) ≤ n(R0 +R1)P (n)e + 1 := nδn (28)
where δn → 0 if P (n)e → 0.
we define the following auxiliary random variable:
Qi := (Y
i−1, Xn2 ,W0). (29)
Note that X2,i → Qi → X1,i and Qi → (X1,i, X2,i)→ (Yi, Y2,i) form Markov chains.
We first consider
nR1,e = H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)
= H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)−H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0, Y n) +H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0, Y n)
(a)
≤ I(W1; Y n|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
≤ I(W1, Xn1 ; Y n|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= I(Xn1 ; Y
n|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + I(W1; Y n|Y n2 , Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(b)
= I(Xn1 ; Y
n|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= H(Xn1 |Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)−H(Xn1 |Y n, Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(c)
= H(Xn1 |Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)−H(Xn1 |Y n, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= I(Xn1 ; Y
n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that Y n is independent
of W0,W1 given Y
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 , and (c) follows from the degradedness condition, i.e., Y
n
2 is
independent of Xn1 ,W0 given Y
n, Xn2 .
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We proceed to bound nR1,e and obtain
nR1,e ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xn1 ; Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ; Y2,i|Y i−12 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)−H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0)
−H(Y2,i|Y i−12 , Xn2 ,W0)−H(Y2,i|Y i−12 , Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)−H(Yi|Y i−1, X1,i, Xn2 ,W0)
−H(Y2,i|Y i−1, Y i−12 , Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y2,i|Y i−1, X1,i, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)−H(Yi|Y i−1, X1,i, Xn2 ,W0)
−H(Y2,i|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y2,i|Y i−1, X1,i, Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Qi, X2,i)−H(Yi|Qi, X2,i, X1,i)
−H(Y2,i|Qi, X2,i) +H(Y2,i|Qi, X2,i, X1,i) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Yi|Qi, X2,i)− I(X1,i; Y2,i|Qi, X2,i) + nδn
(30)
In the preceding equation, the second term of (d) follows from the fact that Yi is independent
of everything else given X1,i and X2,i; the third term of (d) follows from the fact that
conditioning does not increase entropy, and the fourth term of (d) follows from the fact that
Y2,i is independent of everything else given X1,i and X2,i. In (e), the third term follows from
the degraded condition, i.e., Y i−12 is independent of everything else given Y
i−1, X i−12 . The
step (f) follows from the definition of Qi given in (29).
nR0 + nR1,e = H(W0) + nR1,e
(a)
≤ I(W0; Y n) + nR1,e + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0; Yi|Y i−1) + nR1,e + nδn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0; Yi) + nR1,e + nδn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i, Qi; Yi) + I(X1,i; Yi|Qi, X2,i)− I(X1,i; Y2,i|Qi, X2,i) + nδn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i; Yi)− I(X1,i; Y2,i|Qi, X2,i) + nδn
(31)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the chain rule and nonnegativity
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of mutual information, (c) follows from the inequality (30), and (d) used the Markov chain
condition Qi → (X1,i, X2,i)→ (Yi, Y2,i).
The next two inequalities follow the converse proof for the MAC in [15]. For completeness,
we include those steps here.
nR1
(a)
≤ I(W1; Y n|W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
≤ I(Xn1 ,W1; Y n|W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
= I(Xn1 ; Y
n|W0, Xn2 ) + I(W1; Y n|W0, Xn2 , Xn1 ) + nδn
(b)
≤ I(Xn1 ; Y n|W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xn1 ; Yi|Y i−1,W0, Xn2 ) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)−H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0, Xn1 ) + nδn
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0)−H(Yi|Y i−1, Xn2 ,W0, X1,i) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|X2,i, Qi)−H(Yi|X2,i, Qi, X1,i) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Yi|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
(32)
where (a) follows from the partial step in (19), and (b) follows from the Markov chain
condition (W0,W1)→ (X1,i, X2,i)→ Yi.
nR0 + nR1 ≤ I(W0,W1; Y n) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1; Yi|Y i−1) + nδn
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0,W1, X2,i, X1,i) + nδn
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−H(Yi|X2,i, X1,i) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i; Yi) + nδn.
(33)
The converse for Theorem 4 then follows by standard single letter characterization (see
e.g. [15]).
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4.3 A Binary GMAC with One Confidential Message Set
In this section, we study a binary GMAC with one confidential message set, which is a
degraded channel. We first follow [19] to introduce notation and useful lemmas for binary
channels. We then introduce the binary GMAC model we study and present the capacity-
equivocation region for this channel.
We first define the following operation:
a ∗ b := a(1− b) + (1− a)b for 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. (34)
We then define the entropy function
h(a) :=
{
−a log a− (1− a) log(1− a), if 0 < a < 1;
0, if a = 0 or 1.
(35)
The function h(a) is one-to-one for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1/2. The inverse of the entropy function is
limited to h−1(c) ∈ [0, 1/2].
Lemma 3. [19] The function f(u) = h(ρ ∗ h−1(u)), 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 (where ρ ∈ (0, 1/2] is a fixed
parameter) is strictly convex in u.
The following useful lemma is a binary version of the entropy power inequality.
Lemma 4. [19] Consider two binary random vectors Xn and Y n. Let H(Xn) ≥ nv. Let
Yi = Xi ⊕ Zi for i = 1, . . . , n (36)
where Zn is a binary random vector with i.i.d. components and Zi has distribution Pr(Zi =
1) = p0 where 0 < p0 ≤ 1/2. The vectors Xn and Y n can be viewed as inputs and outputs of
a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p0. Then,
H(Y n) ≥ nh(p0 ∗ h−1(v)) (37)
with equality if and only if Xn has independent components, and H(Xi) = v for i =
1, 2, . . . , n.
We now introduce the binary GMAC model of interest. We assume all channel inputs
and outputs have the binary alphabet set {0, 1}. We assume that the channel is discrete
memoryless and the input-output relationship at each time instant satisfies
Yi = X1,i ·X2,i, Y2,i = Yi ⊕ Z2,i for i = 1, . . . , n (38)
where Zn2 is a binary random vector with i.i.d. components and Z2,i has distribution Pr(Z2,i =
1) = p where 0 < p ≤ 1/2. We illustrate the channel input-output relationship in Fig. 4.
Note that the MAC channel from (X1, X2) to Y is a binary multiplier channel. It is clear
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Figure 4: A degraded binary example GMAC
that this GMAC channel is degraded, and the channel outputs Y and Y2 can be viewed as
the input and output of a discrete memoryless BSC with crossover probability p.
We have the following theorem on the capacity-equivocation region of the binary example
GMAC with one confidential message set.
Theorem 5. For the binary GMAC with one confidential message set given in (38), the
capacity-equivocation region is given by
C
B =
⋃
0≤α≤ 1
2


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ h(α),
R0 +R1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ h(α) + h(p)− h(p ∗ α),
R0 +Re ≤ 1 + h(p)− h(p ∗ α)


. (39)
Corollary 2. The secrecy capacity region of the binary GMAC with one confidential message
given in (38) is
CBs =
⋃
0≤α≤ 1
2


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 1,
R1 ≤ h(α) + h(p)− h(p ∗ α),
R0 +R1 ≤ 1 + h(p)− h(p ∗ α)

 . (40)
The secrecy capacity as a function of R0 is given by
CBs (R0) = h(α
∗) + h(p)− h(p ∗ α∗) (41)
where α∗ is determined by the following equation
R0 = 1− h(α∗). (42)
Remark 8. The BSC crossover probability parameter p determines how noisy the channel
from user 1 to user 2 is compared to the channel from user 1 to the destination. When p = 0,
user 2 has the same channel from user 1 as the destination, and hence no secrecy can be
achieved. As p increases, user 2 has a noisier channel from user 1 than the destination, and
hence higher secrecy can be achieved. As p = 1
2
, user 2 is totally confused by confidential
messages sent by user 1, and perfect secrecy is achieved.
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Figure 5: Secrecy capacity regions of the binary GMAC with one confidential message set
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy capacity as a function of R0 for four values of p. These lines of
CBs (R0) also serves as boundaries of the secrecy capacity regions for the binary channel we
study with the vertical axis being viewed as R1. It is clear from Fig. 5 that as p increases, the
secrecy capacity region enlarges, because user 2 is further confused by confidential messages
sent by user 1.
Remark 9. From the achievability proof of Theorem 5 (given in Section 4.4), it can be seen
that the optimal scheme to achieve the secrecy capacity region uses superposition encoding.
To achieve the secrecy capacity corresponding to different values of R0, different values of
the superposition parameter α needs to be chosen to generate the codebook. However, if the
secrecy constraint is not considered, the capacity region of the binary multiplier MAC can be
achieved by a time sharing scheme and superposition encoding is not necessary.
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy capacity as a function of R0 (indicated by the solid line) and
compares it with the secrecy rate achieved by the time sharing scheme (indicated by the
dashed line). The figure demonstrates that the time sharing scheme is strictly suboptimal
to provide the secrecy capacity region. As we commented in Remark 9, although the time
sharing scheme is optimal to achieve the capacity region of the binary multiplier MAC, it
is not optimal to achieve the secrecy capacity region of the binary GMAC, as secrecy is
considered as a performance criterion.
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Figure 6: Comparison of secrecy capacity region and secrecy rate region achieved by time
sharing scheme for the binary example GMAC with one confidential message set
4.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of the Achievability. We apply Theorem 4 to prove that the capacity-equivocation
region (39) is achievable. Let Q and X ′ be two binary random variables with alphabet
{0, 1}, and assume that Q is independent of X ′. We choose the following joint distribution:
Pr{Q = 0} = 1
2
; Pr{X ′ = 1} = α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
;
Pr{X2 = 1} = 1; X1 = Q⊕X ′.
(43)
We now compute the mutual information terms in the achievable region given in Theorem
4 based on the preceding joint distribution.
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q) = H(Y |X2, Q)
= Pr{Q = 0}H(Y |X2 = 1, Q = 0) + Pr{Q = 1}H(Y |X2 = 1, Q = 1)
= h(α)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y ) = H(Y ) = 1
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Re ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)
= h(α)− (H(Y2|X2, Q)−H(Y2|X1, X2))
= h(α)− [Pr{Q = 0}H(Y2|X2 = 1, Q = 0) + Pr{Q = 1}H(Y2|X2 = 1, Q = 1)
− Pr{X1 = 0}H(Y2|X2 = 1, X1 = 0)− Pr{X1 = 1}H(Y2|X2 = 1, X1 = 1)
]
= h(α)− [h(α ∗ p)− h(p)]
= h(α) + h(p)− h(α ∗ p)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) = 1− [h(α ∗ p)− h(p)]
= 1 + h(p)− h(α ∗ p)
Proof of the Converse. We apply the converse bounds obtained in Section 4.2, and further
derive these bounds for the example binary GMAC.
From the first step in (32), we obtain
nR1 ≤ I(Xn1 ; Y n|Xn2 ,W0) + nδn = H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0) + nδn (44)
where we have used the deterministic property of the GMAC, which impliesH(Y n|Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) =
0.
Since {Yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} are binary random variables, H(Yi) ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence
0 ≤ H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi) ≤ n. (45)
It is clear that there exists a parameter α ∈ [0, 1/2] such that
H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0) = nh(α). (46)
Substituting the preceding equation into (44), we obtain
nR1 ≤ nh(α) + nδn. (47)
From (33), we obtain
nR0 + nR1 ≤ I(W0,W1; Y n) + nδn ≤ H(Y n) + nδn
≤ n + nδn.
(48)
From (30), we obtain
nR1,e ≤ I(Xn1 ; Y n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(a)
= nh(α)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y n2 |Y n, Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(b)
= nh(α)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y n2 |Y n) + nδn
= nh(α)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nh(p) + nδn
(49)
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In the preceding bound, the first term in (a) follows from (46), the third term in (a) follows
from the fact that Y n is a deterministic function of (Xn1 , X
n
2 ), and the third term in (b)
follows from the fact that Y n2 is conditionally independent of everything else given Yn.
Since Zn2 in (38) is independent of W0, X
n
2 and Y
n, we apply Lemma 4 to bound the term
H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0).
H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) = EH(Y n2 |Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
(a)
≥ E
[
nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
H(Y n|Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
n
))]
(b)
≥ nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
E
H(Y n|Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
n
))
= nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
H(Y n|Xn2 ,W0)
n
))
(c)
= nh
(
p ∗ h−1
(
nh(α)
n
))
= nh(p ∗ α)
(50)
where (a) follows from Lemma 4, (b) follows from Lemma 3 and Jensen’s inequality, and (c)
follows from (46).
Substituting (50) into (49), we obtain
nR1,e ≤ nh(α) + nh(p)− nh(p ∗ α) + nδn (51)
From (31), we obtain
nR0 + nR1,e ≤ I(W0; Y n) + nR1,e
(a)
≤ I(W0; Y n) + I(Xn1 ; Y n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(b)
≤ I(W0, Xn2 ; Y n) + I(Xn1 ; Y n|Xn2 ,W0)− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= I(W0, X
n
1 , X
n
2 ; Y
n)− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
= H(Y n)− I(Xn1 ; Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0) + nδn
(c)
≤ n + nh(p)− nh(p ∗ α) + nδn
(52)
where (a) follows from (30), (b) follows from the chain rule and nonnegativity of mutual
information, and (c) follows from partial results in deriving R1,e.
5 Gaussian GMAC with One Confidential Message Set
In this section, we study the Gaussian GMAC with one confidential message set, where the
channel outputs at the destination and user 2 are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise terms.
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We assume that the channel is discrete and memoryless, and that the channel input-output
relationship at each time instant is given by
Yi = X1,i +X2,i + Zi
Y2,i = X1,i +X2,i + Z2,i
(53)
where Zn and Zn2 are independent zero mean Gaussian random vectors with i.i.d. compo-
nents. We assume that Zi and Z2,i have variances N and N2, respectively, where N < N2.
The channel input sequences Xn1 and X
n
2 are subject to the average power constraints P1
and P2, respectively, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
X21,i ≤ P1, and
1
n
n∑
i=1
X22,i ≤ P2. (54)
The following theorem states the capacity-equivocation region for the Gaussian GMAC
with one confidential message set.
Theorem 6. For the Gaussian GMAC with one confidential message set given in (53), the
capacity-equivocation region is given by
C
G =
⋃
0≤α≤1


(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
,
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
,
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N2
)
,
R0 +Re ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N2
)


. (55)
where α¯ = 1− α indicating the correlation between the inputs from users 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian GMAC with one confidential
message set given in (53) is
CGs =
⋃
0≤α≤1


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N2
)
,
R0 +R1 ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N2
)


. (56)
The secrecy capacity as a function of R0 is
CGs (R0) =


1
2
log
(
1 +
P1
N
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
P1
N2
)
, if R0 ≤ 1
2
log
P1 + P2 +N
P1 +N
1
2
log
(
1 +
α∗P1
N
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
α∗P1
N2
)
if R0 >
1
2
log
P1 + P2 +N
P1 +N
(57)
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Figure 7: Secrecy capacity regions of Gaussian GMACs with one confidential message set
and capacity region of corresponding Gaussian MAC
where α∗ is determined by the following equation
R0 =
1
2
log
P1 + P2 + 2
√
(1− α∗)P1P2 +N
α∗P1 +N
. (58)
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy capacity CGs (R0) of Gaussian GMACs with one confidential message
set for three user 1-to-user 2 SNR values. The lines of CGs (R0) also serve as boundaries of the
secrecy capacity regions if we view the vertical axis as R1. It can be seen that as user 1-to-
user 2 SNR decreases, which implies that the noise level at user 2 increases, user 2 gets more
confused by confidential messages sent by user 1. Thus the secrecy capacity region enlarges.
As this SNR approaches zero, the secrecy capacity region approaches the entire capacity
region of the Gaussian MAC, which means that perfect secrecy is achieved for almost all
points in the capacity region of the MAC.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 6
To show Theorem 6, we first note that the Gaussian GMAC defined in (53) is not physically
degraded according to Definition 5. However, it is stochastically degraded according to
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Definition 6, because the marginal distribution p(y2|x1, x2) is the same as that of the following
physically degraded Gaussian GMAC:
Yi = X1,i +X2,i + Zi
Y2,i = X1,i +X2,i + Zi + Z
′
i
(59)
where Zn is the same as in (53). The random vector Z ′n is independent of Zn, and has
i.i.d. components with each component having the distribution N (0, N2−N). According to
Lemma 2, it is sufficient to prove Theorem 6 for the physically degraded Gaussian GMAC
defined in (59).
Proof of the Achievability. The achievability follows by computing the mutual information
terms in Theorem 4 with the following joint distribution:
Q = φ, X2 ∼ N (0, P2)
X ′1 ∼ N (0, αP1), and X ′1 is independent of X2
X1 =
√
α¯P1
P2
X2 +X
′
1
(60)
Proof of the Converse. We apply the converse proof for the general degraded GMAC in
Section 4.2, and further derive these bounds for the degraded Gaussian GMAC.
From (32), we obtain
nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Yi|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)− h(Yi|X1,i, X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)− h(Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)− 1
2
log 2πeN + nδn
(61)
For the first term in the preceding inequality, we have
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi) =
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i +X2,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi) =
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
≤
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i + Zi) ≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2πe(EX21,i +N)
(a)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX21,i +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2πe(P1 +N)
(62)
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where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
On the other hand,
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi) ≥
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i +X2,i + Zi|X1,i, X2,i, Qi) = n
2
log 2πeN . (63)
Combining (62) and (63), we establish that there exists some α ∈ [0, 1] such that
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi) = n
2
log 2πe(αP1 +N) . (64)
We hence obtain the bound for R1
nR1 ≤ n
2
log 2πe(αP1 +N)− 1
2
log 2πeN + nδn
=
n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
+ nδn .
(65)
For the term
∑n
i=1 h(Yi|X2,i, Qi), we also derive the following bound:
n∑
i=1
h(Yi|X2,i, Qi)
=
n∑
i=1
h(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
≤
n∑
i=1
EX2,i,Qi
1
2
log 2πeVar(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2πeEX2,i,QiVar(X1,i + Zi|X2,i, Qi)
=
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2πe
(
EX2,i,QiVar(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
=
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2πe
(
E(X21,i)− EX2,i,QiE2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
(b)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(X21,i)−
1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 − 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
(66)
where (a) and (b) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
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Using (64), we have
αP1 +N ≤ P1 − 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
=⇒ 1
n
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) ≤ α¯P1
(67)
From (33), we obtain
nR0 + nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i; Yi) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)− I(Yi|X1,i, X2,i) + nδn
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)− n
2
log 2πeN + nδn
(68)
For the first term in the preceding inequality, we obtain
n∑
i=1
h(Yi) =
n∑
i=1
h(Xi +X1,i + Zi)
≤
n∑
i=1
1
2
log 2πe
(
E(X1,i +X2,i)
2 +N
)
(a)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(X1,i +X2,i)
2 +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX21,i +
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX22,i +
1
n
n∑
i=1
2E(X1,iX2,i) +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 + P2 +
1
n
n∑
i=1
2E(X1,iX2,i) +N
)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 + P2 +
1
n
n∑
i=1
2EX2,i,Qi
(
X2,iE(X1,i|X2,i, Qi)
)
+N
)
(b)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 + P2 +
2
n
n∑
i=1
√
EX2,i,QiX
2
2,i · EX2,i,QiE2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi) +N
)
(c)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 + P2
+ 2
√√√√(1
n
n∑
i=1
EX2,i,QiX
2
2,i
)
·
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
EX2,i,QiE
2(X1,i|X2,i, Qi)
)
+N
)
(d)
≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2 +N
)
(69)
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In the preceding bound, (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, (b) and (c) follows from Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, and (d) follows from (67).
Hence,
nR0 + nR1 ≤ n
2
log 2πe
(
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2 +N
)
− n
2
log 2πeN + nδn
=
n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
+ nδn
(70)
From (30), we obtain
nR1,e ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Yi|X2,i, Qi)− I(X1,i; Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
=
n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
−
n∑
i=1
h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + n
2
log 2πeN2 + nδn
(71)
To bound the term
∑n
i=1 h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) in (71), we first derive the following bound. Since
Z ′i is independent of Yi given X2,i and Qi, by entropy power inequality, we obtain
22h(Yi+Z
′
i
|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) ≥ 22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 22h(Z′i|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi)
= 22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
We then obtain
h(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i = x2,i, Qi = qi) ≥
1
2
log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
)
Taking the expectation on both sides of the preceding equation, we obtain
Eh(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i = x2,i, Qi = qi) ≥
1
2
E log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
)
(a)
≥ 1
2
log
(
22Eh(Yi|X2,i=x2,i,Qi=qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
)
=
1
2
log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i,Qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that log(2x+ c) is a convex function.
Summing over the index i, the preceding inequality becomes
n∑
i=1
h(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i, Qi) ≥
1
2
n∑
i=1
log
(
22h(Yi|X2,i,Qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
)
(a)
≥ n
2
log
(
22
1
n
∑n
i=1 h(Yi|X2,i,Qi) + 2πe(N2 −N)
)
(b)
=
n
2
log (2πe(αP1 +N) + 2πe(N2 −N))
=
n
2
log (2πe(αP1 +N2))
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where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and (b) follows from (67).
Applying the preceding bound to the term
∑n
i=1 h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi), we obtain
n∑
i=1
h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) =
n∑
i=1
h(Yi + Z
′
i|X2,i, Qi) ≥
n
2
log (2πe(αP1 +N2)) (72)
Substituting the preceding bound into (71), we obtain
nR1,e ≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
− n
2
log (2πe(αP1 +N2)) +
n
2
log 2πeN2 + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N
)
− n
2
log
(
1 +
αP1
N2
)
+ nδn
(73)
From (31), we obtain
nR0 + nR1,e
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i; Yi)− I(X1,i; Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
−
n∑
i=1
h(Y2,i|X2,i, Qi) + n
2
log 2πeN2 + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− n
2
log (2πe(αP1 +N2)) +
n
2
log 2πeN2 + nδn
≤ n
2
log
(
1 +
P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2
N
)
− n
2
log(1 +
αP1
N2
) + nδn,
(74)
which completes the proof.
6 GMAC with Two Confidential Message Sets
In this section, we consider the general case of the GMAC with (two) confidential mes-
sages, where the two users have common messages and each user has private (confidential)
messages intended for the destination. Each user wants to keep the other user as ignorant
of its confidential messages as possible. For this case, the rate-equivocation tuple has five
components and takes the form (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e), where R1,e and R2,e are equivocation
rates indicating the secrecy levels of confidential messages sent by user 1 and confidential
messages sent by user 2, respectively.
In the following, we first provide our main results on the achievable rate-equivocation
region and secrecy rate region. It can be seen that the rate-equivocation region has a more
complicated form compared to that of the case with a single confidential message set, and
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carries a new feature of the trade-off between the secrecy levels that can be achieved for
the two confidential message sets. We then give an intuitive interpretation of the rate-
equivocation region, following which we provide a rigorous proof of the rate-equivocation
region. Finally, we give an equivalence proof of two regions, which simplifies the rate-
equivocation region to an explicit form.
6.1 Main Results
The following theorem provides an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region for the
GMAC with two confidential message sets.
Theorem 7. The following convexified region of nonnegative rate-equivocation tuples is
achievable for the GMAC with two confidential message sets:
R
II = Convex
⋃
p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)
p(v|q)p(x2|v)
p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2)


(R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |V,Q),
R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |U,Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V ; Y |Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q; Y ),
(R1,e, R2,e) ∈ Se(R0, R1, R2)


. (75)
where
Se(R0, R1, R2) =
⋃
(R′1, R
′
2) :
(R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ CpMAC ,
R1 ≤ R′1, R2 ≤ R′2


(R0, R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [R′1 − I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [R′2 − I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+


(76)
where CpMAC is defined as
CpMAC =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |V,Q),
R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |U,Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V ; Y |Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q; Y )


. (77)
An intuitive interpretation of the rate-equivocation region in Theorem 7 is given in the
next subsection. The proof will be provided in Section 6.3.
Note that the region Se(R0, R1, R2) contains the secrecy rate pairs (R1,e, R2,e) that can be
achieved for the given rate tuple (R0, R1, R2). It can be seen that Se(R0, R1, R2) in (76) is
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characterized by a union of a set of (R′1, R
′
2), which is not an explicit form. It is thus desirable
to change Se(R0, R1, R2) to an explicit form that is characterized through inequality bounds
only.
Theorem 8. The set Se(R0, R1, R2) in (76) can be expressed in the following explicit form:
Se(R0, R1, R2) = L1(R0, R1, R2) ∪ L2(R0, R1, R2) ∪ L3(R0, R1, R2) (78)
where
L1(R0, R1, R2)
=


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R1,e ≤ [I(U ; Y |V,Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V ; Y |Q)− R2 − I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q; Y )−R0 − R2 − I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+
R2,e ≤ [I(V ; Y |U,Q)− I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V ; Y |Q)− R1 − I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q; Y )−R0 − R1 − I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+
R1,e +R2,e ≤ [I(U, V ; Y |Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)− I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R1,e +R2,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q; Y )− R0 − I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)− I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+


(79)
L2(R0, R1, R2) =


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [I(U ; Y |V,Q)− I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V ; Y |Q)−R2 − I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q; Y )− R0 −R2 − I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)]+
R2,e = 0


(80)
and
L3(R0, R1, R2) =


(R1,e, R2,e) :
R1,e = 0,
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [I(V ; Y |U,Q)− I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V ; Y |Q)−R1 − I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q; Y )−R0 − R1 − I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q)]+


(81)
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Section 6.4.
Remark 10. The region (75) reduces to the capacity region of the MAC [15] by removing
the secrecy constraints (R1,e = 0, R2,e = 0) and setting U = X1 and V = X2.
Remark 11. The last two bounds in (79) indicate that there is a trade-off between the two
equivocation rates R1,e and R2,e, i.e., the secrecy levels achieved for the two confidential
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message sets W1 and W2. It will be clear in Section 6.2 that this trade-off can be achieved by
using codebooks that achieve different boundary points of the MAC. It will be further clear in
Section 6.3 that this trade-off corresponds to a trade-off between the sizes of the two codebooks
used by the two users.
Remark 12. The sets L2(R0, R1, R2) and L3(R0, R1, R2) characterize the equivocation rates
when only user 1 or user 2 achieves nonzero equivocation rates.
We now study the case where confidential messages of each user are perfectly hidden from
the other user. This happens when R1,e = R1 and R2,e = R2. The rate region that contains
all these rate tuples is called the secrecy capacity region and is given by
CIIs = {(R0, R1, R2) : (R0, R1, R2, R1, R2) ∈ C II}. (82)
The following inner bound on the secrecy capacity region CIIs follows from Theorem 7 and
Theorem 8.
Corollary 4. A secrecy rate region (inner bound on secrecy capacity region) for the GMAC
with two confidential message sets is given by:
RIIs = Convex
⋃
p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)
p(v|q)p(x2|v)p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2)
{
Rs,1 ∪Rs,2 ∪Rs,3
}
(83)
where
Rs,1 =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |V,Q)− I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q),
R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |U,Q)− I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V ; Y |Q)− I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q)− I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q; Y )− I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q)− I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q)


(84)
Rs,2 =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 = 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ; Y |V,Q)− I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U, V,Q; Y )− I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q)

 (85)
Rs,3 =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0, R1 = 0,
R2 ≤ I(V ; Y |U,Q)− I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q),
R0 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q; Y )− I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q)

 (86)
For the GMAC with two confidential message sets, it is desirable that both users achieve
positive secrecy rates. We have the following sufficient condition for this case to happen.
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Corollary 5. A sufficient condition for both users to have positive secrecy rates is that
I(U ; Y |V,Q) > I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q) (87)
for some joint distribution p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(v|q)p(x2|v)p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2), and
I(V ; Y |U,Q) > I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q) (88)
for some joint distribution p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(v|q)p(x2|v)p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2).
Note that the joint distributions that satisfy the two conditions (87) and (88) are not
necessarily the same.
Proof. From (85), it is clear that if (87) is satisfied, user 1 achieves positive secrecy rate (for
R0 = 0). Similarly, from (86), user 2 achieves positive rate if (88) is satisfied. Therefore,
time-sharing between these two operating points guarantees positive secrecy rates for both
users.
In Fig. 8, we plot the secrecy rate region for the GMAC with two confidential message
sets for a given distribution p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(v|q)p(x2|v)p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2). For the given
joint distribution, we assume that both conditions in Corollary 5 are satisfied, i.e., both
users have nonzero secrecy rates. Moreover, we assume that the bounds on the sum rate
R1 + R2 in (84) is positive, i.e., the region Rs,1 is nonempty. The geometric structure of
the secrecy rate region (shaded area) falls into one of the four cases depending on how the
mutual information terms compare with each other. In Fig. 8 we also plot the capacity of the
corresponding MAC without secrecy constraints (setting Y1 = φ and Y2 = φ in the GMAC)
with the outer solid line as the boundary. It is clear from the figure that the secrecy rate
region is inside the capacity region of the corresponding MAC. Hence to achieve perfectly
secure communication for confidential messages, the users need to transmit their confidential
messages at smaller rates than reliable communication rates. It is also clear from Fig. 8 that
the secrecy rate region given by Rs,1 ∪ Rs,2 ∪ Rs,3 is not convex in general and needs to be
convexfied. These cases of secrecy regions will be further discussed in the next section and
intuition behind the achievability of the corner points will be given.
6.2 Interpretation of RII in Theorem 7
In this subsection, we explain the intuition behind the achievable rate-equivocation region
R
II given in Theorem 7. A rigorous proof is relegated to the next subsection.
We focus on the following region R˜ given in Theorem 7. The region RII given in (75)
follows from R˜ by prefixing two discrete memoryless channels with inputs U and V and
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Figure 8: Secrecy rate region for the GMAC with two confidential message sets for a given
joint distribution
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transition probabilities p(x1|u) and p(x2|v) to the given GMAC (similar to [3, Lemma 4]).
R˜ =
⋃
p(q)p(x1|q)p(x2|q)
p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2)


(R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e) :
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q),
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y |X1, Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y |Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y ),
(R1,e, R2,e) ∈ S˜e(R0, R1, R2)


. (89)
where
S˜e(R0, R1, R2) =
⋃
(R′
1
,R′
2
)∈A(R0 ,R1,R2)


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+


(90)
where
A(R0, R1, R2) := {(R′1, R′2) : (R0, R′1, R′2) ∈ C˜pMAC , R1 ≤ R′1, R2 ≤ R′2}, (91)
and
C˜pMAC =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q),
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y |X1, Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y |Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )


(92)
It is easy to see that the first four bounds in R˜ in (89) are the bounds that define the
capacity region of the MAC [15]. Hence these bounds also need to be satisfied for the GMAC
with two confidential message sets. To understand the bounds on (R1,e, R2,e), we plot Fig. 9
for illustration. In Fig. 9, the solid line indicates the boundary of the region C˜pMAC for a
given common rate R0.
For a given rate tuple (R0, R1, R2) that satisfies the first four bounds in (89), which also
means that (R0, R1, R2) ∈ C˜pMAC , we plot the region A(R0, R1, R2) of (R′1, R′2) in Fig. 9 as
the shaded area. It is clear that the rate tuple (R0, R1, R2) can be achieved by applying the
codebook that achieves any rate tuples (R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ A(R0, R1, R2) and throwing away the
redundant bits R′1 −R1 and R′2 −R2. However, it is a waste of channel resources to achieve
a rate tuple with lower rate components by applying a codebook that achieves a rate tuple
with higher rate components.
The situation becomes different for channels with confidential message sets, where one user
(say user 1) wants to keep its confidential information secret from the other user (user 2).
Now to achieve a rate R1, user 1 may transmit at a higher rate R
′
1 so that the codebook
contains a larger number of codewords than the number of messages that user 1 wants to
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Figure 9: Region C˜pMAC for a given common rate R0
convey to the destination. The redundant codewords are used to confuse user 2 about real
messages that user 1 transmits to the destination. Since user 2 can decode at the rate of
the capacity of the channel from user 1 to user 2, which is I(X1; Y2|X2, Q), intuitively user
1 can keep information with the rate R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) secret from user 2. Similarly,
user 2 can keep information with the rate R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q) secret from user 1. Hence
the equivocation rates R1,e = R
′
1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) and R2,e = R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q) can be
achieved by the codebook achieving (R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) for the MAC. We hence conclude that all
equivocation rate pair (R1,e, R2,e) in S˜e(R0, R1, R2) given in (90) are achievable.
Note that there is no loss of generality to consider only the rate tuples (R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈
A(R0, R1, R2) that are on the sum rate boundary of the region C˜pMAC , i.e., the points on
the line between the point A and point B in Fig. 9. This is because any point inside
A(R0, R1, R2) corresponds to a point on the line from A to B that achieves larger R1,e and
R2,e. To operate at different points between A and B, user 1 and user 2 use different sizes of
codebooks, and achieve different equivocation rate pairs (R1,e, R2,e). As the operating point
moves from A to B, the equivocation rate R1,e increases and R2,e decreases, thus achieving
a trade-off between the security levels for the two confidential message sets sent by user 1
and user 2 as commented in Remark 11.
Based on the preceding interpretation, we next give intuition for the secrecy rate region
given in Corollary 4. In particular, we focus on the secrecy rate region of case 1 in Fig. 8.
We plot this case in more detail in Fig. 10.
We first consider case 1, where both of the following two conditions are satisfied:
I(V ; Y |Q) > I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q) (93)
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Figure 10: Secrecy rate region of case 1: I(V ; Y |Q) > I(V ; Y1|X1, U,Q) and I(U ; Y |Q) >
I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q)
and
I(U ; Y |Q) > I(U ; Y2|X2, V, Q) (94)
so that the secrecy rate region is a pentagon. All rate tuples in the secrecy rate region can
be achieved with confidential messages of the two users being perfectly secret from each
other. However, to achieve perfect secrecy for rate tuples in the shaded area, the two users
may need to use codebooks achieving rate tuples outside the shaded area with larger rate
components. In this way, the size of the codebook used by each user is larger than the actual
number of confidential messages that need to be delivered, and the redundant codewords in
the codebook are used to confuse the other user. For example, consider the corner point A
of the secrecy rate region in Fig. 10. The rates of the two confidential message sets are:
RA,1 = I(U ; Y |Q)− I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q) (95)
RA,2 = I(V ; Y |U,Q)− I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q) (96)
To achieve the point A with perfect secrecy, the actual codebook being used needs to operate
at the point A′ which is on the boundary of the capacity region of the MAC. The rates
corresponding to A′ are:
RA′,1 = I(U ; Y |Q) (97)
RA′,2 = I(V ; Y |U,Q) (98)
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If we compare the rate tuples corresponding to the points A and A′, it is easy to see that the
secrecy rates decrease from the actual rates of the codebook by the capacities of the channels
between the two users, i.e., I(U ; Y2|V,X2, Q) and I(V ; Y1|U,X1, Q). In fact, every point on
the boundary of the secrecy rate region of case 1 in Fig. 10 is achieved by the codebook that
operates at a corresponding point on the boundary of the capacity region of the MAC.
6.3 Proof of the Achievability of RII in Theorem 7
In this section, we show that the rate-equivocation region RII given in Theorem 7 is achiev-
able. We first show that the region R˜ given in (89) is achievable. Then RII in Theorem
7 is achievable follows by prefixing two discrete memoryless channels as reasoned at the
beginning of the preceding section.
We present the proof in four steps. In Step 1, we prove existence of a certain codebook
based on a random coding technique, which is different from the nonrandom code construc-
tion used in [3]. Our random coding proof is also different from the proof in [2] in that the
codeword ensemble contains only typical sequences, which makes equivocation computation
convenient. In Step 2, we define our encoding scheme. In Step 3, we compute the two equiv-
ocation rates. The technique follows [3, Sec. IV]. In Step 4, we consider other cases where
the encoding scheme is slightly different from the case considered in the preceding steps.
Step 1: Existence of Certain Codebook
We consider the following joint distribution
PQX1X2Y Y1Y2 = p(q)p(x1|q)p(x2|q)p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2)
We use T nǫ (PQX1X2Y Y1Y2) to indicate the strong typical set defined by the distribution PQX1X2Y Y1Y2 .
Consider a given rate triple (R0, R1, R2) ∈ C˜pMAC , where C˜pMAC is given in (92). We wish
to find a codebook that achieves (R0, R1, R2) with small probability of error, and achieves
certain equivocation rates R1,e and R2,e. We consider (R
′
1, R
′
2) that satisfy the following
conditions:
(R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ C˜pMAC , R1 ≤ R′1, R2 ≤ R′2 (99)
and
R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) > 0, R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q) > 0 (100)
The cases where R′1− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) ≤ 0 or R′2− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q) ≤ 0 will be considered in
Step 4.
The following lemma states existence of a certain codebook, which will be used for encoding
in Step 2.
39
Lemma 5. For a given rate triple (R0, R1, R2) ∈ C˜pMAC, there exists the following codebook:
C =


qni , i = 1, . . . , 2
nR0;
xn1,iab, i = 1, . . . , 2
nR0; a = 1, . . . , A; b = 1, . . . , B;
xn2,ist, i = 1, . . . , 2
nR0; s = 1, . . . , S; t = 1, . . . , T ;

 (101)
where all codewords are strongly typical, i.e., qni ∈ T nǫ (PQ), xn1,iab ∈ T nǫ (PX1|Q|qni ), xn2,ist ∈
T nǫ (PX2|Q|qni ) for all i, a, b, s, t. The number of codewords are defined as follows:
1
n
logA = R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q),
1
n
logB = I(X1; Y2|X2, Q),
1
n
log S = R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q),
1
n
log T = I(X2; Y1|X1, Q).
(102)
We define the following probabilities of error when the codewords xn1,iab and x
n
2,ist are trans-
mitted by user 1 and user 2, respectively:
λiabst =Error probability for the destination to decode x
n
1,iab and x
n
2,ist;
λ1,b|iast =Error probability for user 2 to decode x
n
1,iab given i, a, s, t;
λ2,t|iabs =Error probability for user 1 to decode x
n
2,ist given i, a, b, s.
(103)
Let piabst be the probability that codewords x
n
1,iab and x
n
2,ist are transmitted by user 1 and
user 2, respectively. We further define the following average probabilities of error:
λ =
∑
iabst
piabstλiabst;
λ1 =
∑
iabst
piabstλ1,b|iast;
λ2 =
∑
iabst
piabstλ2,t|iabs.
(104)
For sufficiently large n, the codebook described in (101) satisfies
λ < ǫ, λ1 < ǫ, and λ2 < ǫ, (105)
for any arbitrary 0 < ǫ < 1.
In Fig. 11, we plot an example codebook that is described in the preceding lemma. We
can interpret each row in the codebook as a subcodebook. If each of the two users randomly
chooses one codeword from its codebook and sends it over the channel, the destination
can decode these pair of codewords with small average error probability, because λ < ǫ.
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Figure 11: Codebook for users 1 and 2
However, each user as a receiver can only decode the codeword sent by the other user with
small average probability of error if it knows to which row the transmitted codeword belongs.
This is because λ1 < ǫ and λ2 < ǫ. Therefore, while the destination decodes reliably over
the entire codebook, the two users decode reliably only within rows of the codebook.
Proof. We prove the lemma using a random coding technique. We define the following sum
of error probabilities:
pe = λ+ λ1 + λ2 =
∑
iabst
piabst(λiabst + λ1,b|iast + λ2,t|iabs). (106)
We show that the average of pe over a random codebook ensemble is small for sufficiently
large codeword length n. Then, there must exist at least one codebook such that pe is small
for sufficiently large n.
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For a given distribution p(q)p(x1|q)p(x2|q), we construct random codebooks by the follow-
ing generating steps.
1. Generate 2nR0 codewords qn, each uniformly drawn from the set T nǫ (PQ). Index q
n
i ,
i = 1, . . . , 2nR0.
2. For each qni , generate 2
nR′
1 codewords xn1 , each uniformly drawn from the set T
n
ǫ (PX1|Q|qni ).
Index xn1,iab, a = 1, . . . , A; b = 1, . . . , B.
3. For each qni , generate 2
nR′
2 codewords xn2 , each uniformly drawn from the set T
n
ǫ (PX2|Q|qni ).
Index xn2,ist, s = 1, . . . , S; t = 1, . . . , T .
Suppose the codewords xn1,iab and x
n
2,ist are transmitted by user 1 and user 2, respectively,
we define the following decoding strategies at the destination, user 1 and user 2.
1. Destination declares that the indices of xn1 and x
n
2 are iˆ, aˆ, bˆ, sˆ, tˆ if there is a unique
group of such indices such that
(
qn
iˆ
, xn
1,ˆiaˆbˆ
, xn
2,ˆisˆtˆ
, yn
)
∈ T nǫ (PQX1X2Y ).
2. User 2, given i, a, s, t, declares that the index b of xn1,iab is bˆ if there is a unique bˆ such
that
(
qni , x
n
1,iabˆ
, xn2,ist, y
n
2
)
∈ T nǫ (PQX1X2Y2).
3. User 1, given i, a, b, s, declares that the index t of xn2,ist is tˆ if there is a unique tˆ such
that
(
qni , x
n
1,iab, x
n
2,istˆ
, yn1
)
∈ T nǫ (PQX1X2Y1).
We can compute EC[pe] by following the standard techniques as in [15, Chap. 14], where
EC indicates averaging over the random codebook ensemble. We can show that
EC[pe] < ǫ, (107)
for sufficiently large codeword length n, by using the fact that (R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ C˜pMAC and the
sizes of indices b and t are B = 2nI(X1;Y2|X2,Q) and T = 2nI(X2;Y1|X1,Q), respectively.
Hence there exists one codebook such that for sufficiently large codebook size n,
pe = λ+ λ1 + λ2 < ǫ. (108)
This leads to the conclusion that for sufficiently large codebook size n
λ < ǫ, λ1 < ǫ, and λ2 < ǫ. (109)
Step 2: Encoding
Based on the codebook given in Lemma 5, we define an encoding strategy to achieve the
given rate tuple (R0, R1, R2) with certain equivocation rates (R1,e, R2,e). The equivocation
rates (R1,e, R2,e) will be computed in Step 3.
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We first assume that R1 > R
′
1−I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) and R2 > R′2−I(X2; Y1|X1, Q). The cases
where R1 ≤ R′1− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) or R2 ≤ R′2− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q) will be considered in Step 4.
We denote common messages by W0 ∈ W = [1, 2nR0], and denote confidential messages
sent by the two users by W1 ∈ W1 = [1, 2nR1] and W2 ∈ W2 = [1, 2nR2], respectively. We
further define the following sets
A = [1, A], B = [1, B], S = [1, S], T = [1, T ] (110)
where A,B, S, T are defined in (102). We let
W1 = A×J (111)
where J = [1, J ] and 1
n
log J = R1 − [R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)], and
W2 = S × K (112)
where K = [1, K] and 1
n
logK = R2 − [R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)].
We define the following mappings:
g1 : B → J , partitioning B into J subsets with nearly equal size;
g2 : T → K, partitioning T into K subsets with nearly equal size,
(113)
where “early equal size” means
‖g−11 (j1)‖ ≤ 2‖g−11 (j2)‖ ∀ j1, j2 ∈ J (114)
and
‖g−12 (k1)‖ ≤ 2‖g−12 (k2)‖ ∀ k1, k2 ∈ K. (115)
The two encoders at users 1 and 2 are defined in the following:
f0 : W0 → {qni }, mapping w0 → i;
f1 : (W0,W1)→ {xn1,iab}, mapping w0 → i, and mapping w1 = (a, j)→ (a, b),
where b is chosen uniformly from the set g−11 (j) ⊂ B;
f2 : (W0,W2)→ {xn2,ist}, mapping w0 → i, and mapping w2 = (s, k)→ (s, t),
where t is chosen uniformly from the set g−12 (k) ⊂ T .
(116)
The idea of the above encoding strategy is as follows. From Step 1, it is clear that users
decode reliably within rows of the codebook and are not able to decode across different rows.
Hence each user tries to map its confidential messages across different rows of the codebook
to prevent the other user from decoding its messages.
Step 3: Equivocation Computation
Based on the codebook given in Lemma 5 in Step 1 and the encoding functions defined in
(116) in Step 2, we have the following joint probability distribution:
p(w0)p(w1)p(w2)f0(q
n|w0)f1(xn1 |w0, w1)f2(xn2 |w0, w2)p(yn, yn1 , yn2 |xn1 , xn2 ). (117)
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In (117), p(w0), p(w1) and p(w2) are uniform distributions, i.e., the messages are uniformly
chosen from the three message sets. The encoding function f0 is a deterministic one-to-one
mapping, and f1 and f2 are random mapping functions as defined in (116) in Step 2. For
the joint distribution given in (117), we note the following two Markov chain conditions:
W2 → (Xn2 ,W0)→ (W1, Xn1 , Y n1 , Y n2 , Y n); (118)
and
W1 → (Xn1 ,W0)→ (W2, Xn2 , Y n1 , Y n2 , Y n). (119)
We first compute the equivocation rate of W1 at user 2 in the following.
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0,W2)
(a)
= H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0)
= H(W1, Y
n
2 |Xn2 ,W0)−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
= H(W1, Y
n
2 , X
n
1 |Xn2 ,W0)−H(Xn1 |W0,W1, Y n2 , Xn2 )−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
= H(W1, X
n
1 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0,W1)−H(Xn1 |W0,W1, Y n2 , Xn2 )
−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
(b)
≥ H(Xn1 |W0) +H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 )−H(Xn1 |W0,W1, Y n2 , Xn2 )−H(Y n2 |Xn2 ,W0)
(120)
In the preceding equation, (a) follows from the Markov condition given in (118). The first
term in (b) follows from the following
H(W1, X
n
1 |Xn2 ,W0) = H(Xn1 |Xn2 ,W0) +H(W1|Xn1 , Xn2 ,W0)
≥ H(Xn1 |Xn2 ,W0) = H(Xn1 |W0)
(121)
The second term in (b) follows from the fact that Y n2 is independent ofW0,W1 given X
n
1 , X
n
2 .
We now compute the four terms in (120) one by one. To compute the first term, we first
show the following useful lemma.
Lemma 6. ([3]) Consider a discrete random variableX with the mass points being x1, . . . , xm
and the probability mass function satisfying
Pr{X = xi}
Pr{X = xj} ≤ 2 · 2
δ ∀ i, j ∈ [1, . . . , m]. (122)
Then,
H(X) ≥ logm− δ − 1 (123)
Proof. Let pi = Pr{X = xi} for i = 1, . . . , m. Let
pmax = max{p1, . . . , pm}, and pmin = min{p1, . . . , pm}. (124)
We have pmax
pmin
≤ 2 · 2δ by assumption. Hence
pmax ≤ 2 · 2
δ
m
mpmin ≤ 2 · 2
δ
m
(125)
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where we have used mpmin ≤ 1. We can then bound the entropy of X as follows.
H(X) =
m∑
i=1
−pi log pi ≥
m∑
i=1
−pi log pmax
= − log pmax ≥ − log 2 · 2
δ
m
= logm− δ − 1
(126)
For the first term in (120), we note that for each W0 = i, X
n
1 has 2
nR′
1 possible values.
According to the encoding mapping function f1 defined in (116), we have
Pr{Xn1 = xn1}
Pr{Xn1 = x¯n1}
≤ 2 ∀ xn1 , x¯n1 ∈ {xn1,iab} (127)
By using Lemma 6, we obtain
1
n
H(Xn1 |W0) ≥ R′1 −
1
n
. (128)
For the second term in (120), we have
1
n
H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 )
=
1
n
∑
xn
1
,xn
2
Pr{Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2}H(Y n2 |Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2 )
≥ 1
n
∑
(xn
1
,xn
2
)∈Tnǫ [PX1X2 ]
Pr{Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2}H(Y n2 |Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2 )
=
1
n
∑
(xn
1
,xn
2
)∈Tnǫ [PX1X2 ]
Pr{Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2}
·
∑
(a,b)∈X1×X2
N(a, b|xn1 , xn2 )
∑
y2∈Y2
−p(y2|a, b) log p(y2|a, b)
(a)
≥
∑
(xn
1
,xn
2
)∈Tnǫ [PX1X2 ]
Pr{Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2}
∑
(a,b)∈X1×X2
(
P (X1 = a,X2 = b)− ǫ
) ∑
y2∈Y2
−p(y2|a, b) log p(y2|a, b)
=
∑
(xn
1
,xn
2
)∈Tnǫ [PX1X2 ]
Pr{Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2}
(
H(Y2|X1, X2)− O(ǫ)
)
(b)
≥ (1− ǫ)H(Y2|X1, X2)− O(ǫ)
≥ H(Y2|X1, X2)− O(ǫ)
(129)
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where O(ǫ) → 0 as ǫ → 0. In the above equation, (a) follows from the definition that
(xn1 , x
n
2 ) ∈ T nǫ [PX1X2 ]. The inequality (b) makes use of the following∑
(xn
1
,xn
2
)∈Tnǫ (PX1X2)
Pr{Xn1 = xn1 , Xn2 = xn2} ≥ 1− pe ≥ 1− ǫ. (130)
To compute the third term in (120), we define
ρ(w0, w1, y
n
2 , x
n
2 ) =


xn1,w0ab if there is a unique b such that
(qnw0 , x
n
1,w0ab
, xn2 , y
n
2 ) ∈ T nǫ (PQX1X2Y2)
arbitrary otherwise
(131)
Then
Pr{Xn1 6= ρ(W0,W1, Y n2 , Xn2 )}
=
∑
w0,a,b,s,t
pw0,a,b,s,tPr{xn1,w0ab 6= ρ(w0, w1, Y n2 , xn2,w0st)|w0, a, b, s, t}
= λ1 < ǫ
(132)
Therefore, by Fano’s inequality, we obtain
1
n
H(Xn1 |W0,W1, Y n2 , Xn2 ) ≤
1
n
(
1 + λ1 log 2
n(R0+R′1)
)
< ǫ2 (133)
where ǫ2 is small for sufficiently large n.
To compute the fourth term in (120), we define
yˆn2 =
{
yn2 if (q
n
w0 , x
n
2 , y
n
2 ) ∈ T nǫ (PQX2Y2)
arbitrary otherwise
(134)
We then obtain
1
n
H(Y n2 |W0, Xn2 )
=
1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}H(Y n2 |Xn2 = xn2 ,W0 = w0)
≤ 1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}H(Y n2 , Yˆ n2 |W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 )
=
1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}
·
(
H(Yˆ n2 |W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 ) +H(Y n2 |W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 , Yˆ n2 )
)
(135)
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The first term in the preceding equation can be bounded as
1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}H(Yˆ n2 |W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 )
≤ 1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2} log ‖T nǫ (PY2|X2,Q|qnw0, xn2 )‖
≤
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}(H(Y2|X2, Q) + ǫ)
≤ H(Y2|X2, Q) + ǫ
(136)
To bound the second term in (135), we use Fano’s inequality and obtain
1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}H(Y n2 |W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 , Yˆ n2 )
≤ 1
n
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}
(
1 + Pr{Y n2 6= Y n2 |W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2} log |Y2|n
)
=
1
n
+
∑
w0,xn2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2}
· Pr
{
(qnw0 , x
n
2 , y
n
2 ) /∈ T nǫ (PQX2Y2)|W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2
}
log |Y2|
≤ 1
n
+
∑
w0,xn1 ,x
n
2
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 , Xn1 = xn1}
· Pr
{
(qnw0 , x
n
1 , x
n
2 , y
n
2 ) /∈ T nǫ (PQX1X2Y2)
}
log |Y2|
(a)
≤ 1
n
+
∑
w0,xn1 ,x
n
2
:
(qnw0 ,x
n
1
,xn
2
)/∈Tnǫ
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 , Xn1 = xn1} log |Y2|
+
∑
w0,xn1 ,x
n
2
:
(qnw0 ,x
n
1
,xn
2
)∈Tnǫ
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 , Xn1 = xn1}
· Pr{(qnw0, xn1 , xn2 , yn2 ) /∈ T nǫ (PQX1X2Y2)} log |Y2|
≤ ǫ3
(137)
where ǫ3 is small for sufficiently large n. In the preceding equation, the second term in (a)
is small because ∑
w0,xn1 ,x
n
2
:
(qnw0 ,x
n
1
,xn
2
)/∈Tnǫ
Pr{W0 = w0, Xn2 = xn2 , Xn1 = xn1} ≤ pe ≤ ǫ. (138)
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Hence, the fourth term in (120) is
1
n
H(Y n2 |W0, Xn2 ) ≤ H(Y2|X2, Q) + ǫ3 (139)
Substituting (128), (129), (133) and (139) into (120), we obtain
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0,W2) ≥ R′1 +H(Y2|X1, X2)−H(Y2|X2, Q)− ǫ4
= R′1 +H(Y2|X1, X2, Q)−H(Y2|X2, Q)− ǫ4
= R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)− ǫ4
(140)
where ǫ4 is small for sufficiently large n.
Similarly, we can also obtain
H(W2|Y n1 , Xn1 ,W0,W1) ≥ R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)− ǫ5 (141)
where ǫ5 is small for sufficiently large n.
Hence, using the codebook given in Lemma 5 in Step 1 and the encoding functions defined
in (116) in Step 2, the equivocation rates for sufficiently large n are given by
R1,e ≤ R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) (142)
and
R2,e ≤ R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q). (143)
Step 4: Other Cases
In Step 1, we have assumed that R′1 > I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) and R′2 > I(X2; Y1|X1, Q). If
R′1 ≤ I(X1; Y2|X2, Q), we generate 2nR1 codewords xn1 , and do not require λ1 < ǫ in Lemma
5. We set R1,e = 0. Similarly, if R
′
2 ≤ I(X2; Y1|X1, Q), we set R2,e = 0.
In Step 2, we have assumed that R1 > R
′
1−I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) and R2 > R′2−I(X2; Y1|X1, Q).
If R1 ≤ R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q), we change the encoder f1 to be the following:
f1 : (W0,W1)→ {xn1,iab}, mapping (w0, w1)→ xn1,w0w1b,
where b is chosen uniformly from the set [1, 2nI(X1;Y2|X2,Q)]
(144)
In this case, note that the number of codewords is less than the number of rows in the
codebook. The encoding strategy is to map each codeword to each row. It is expected that
in this case the other user (user 2) is not able to decode any information, and hence user 1
achieves perfect secrecy.
In fact, the first term of the equivocation rate in (120) becomes
1
n
H(X1|W0) = R1 + I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) (145)
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because for each W0 = i, X
n
1 has 2
n(R1+I(X1;Y2|X2,Q)) possible equally likely values. All other
terms in (120) remain the same as before. We hence have
H(W1|Y n2 , Xn2 ,W0,W2)
≥ R1 + I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) +H(Y2|X1, X2)−H(Y2|X2, Q)− ǫ
= R1 + I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)− ǫ
= R1 − ǫ.
(146)
Thus, for sufficiently large n,
R1,e ≤ R1, (147)
and user 1 achieves perfect secrecy.
We can similarly obtain that if R2 ≤ R′2− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q), user 2 achieves perfect secrecy,
i.e.,
R2,e ≤ R2. (148)
Hence in summary, for a given point (R0, R1, R2) ∈ C˜pMAC , the achievable equivocation
rate pairs are in the set S˜e(R0, R1, R2) defined in (90).
6.4 Proof of Theorem 8
In this section, we change Se(R0, R1, R2) given in (76) to an explicit form that is characterized
by inequality bounds only. We need only to derive the explicit form for S˜e(R0, R1, R2) given
in (90). The explicit form for Se(R0, R1, R2) follows by prefixing two discrete memoryless
channels to the GMAC as reasoned at the beginning of Section 6.2.
We first characterize S˜e(R0, R1, R2) given in (90) in a more convenient form. We define
the following set B(R0, R1, R2) of (R′1, R′2):
B(R0, R1, R2) :=


(R′1, R
′
2) :
R′1 ≤ I(X1; Y |X2, Q),
R′1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y |Q),
R0 +R
′
1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )
R′2 ≤ I(X2; Y |X1, Q),
R1 +R
′
2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y |Q),
R0 +R1 +R
′
2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )
R′1 +R
′
2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y |Q),
R0 +R
′
1 +R
′
2 ≤ I(X1, X2; Y )


(149)
For S˜e(R0, R1, R2), if we replace union over the set A(R0, R1, R2) with union over the set
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B(R0, R1, R2) as in the following, the region S˜e(R0, R1, R2) remains unchanged; i.e.,
S˜e(R0, R1, R2) =
⋃
(R′
1
,R′
2
)∈B(R0,R1,R2)


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+


. (150)
To see this, we plot the two sets A(R0, R1, R2) and B(R0, R1, R2) in Fig. 12. For any point
(r′1, r
′
2) that is in B(R0, R1, R2) but not in A(R0, R1, R2), there exists a corresponding point
(r¯′1, r¯
′
2) ∈ A(R0, R1, R2) such that r′1 ≤ r¯′1 and r′2 ≤ r¯′2. Hence

(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [r′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [r′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+


⊂


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [r¯′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [r¯′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+


(151)
Therefore, those points that are in B(R0, R1, R2) but not in A(R0, R1, R2) do not contribute
new (R1,e, R2,e) for S˜e(R0, R1, R2).
We now show that S˜e(R0, R1, R2) given in (150) is equivalent to the following region
S˜ ′e(R0, R1, R2).
S˜ ′e = L˜1 ∪ L˜2 ∪ L˜3 (152)
where
L˜1 =


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1, 0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R1,e ≤ [I(X1; Y |X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y |Q)−R2 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y )−R0 − R2 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+
R2,e ≤ [I(X2; Y |X1, Q)− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y |Q)−R1 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y )−R0 − R1 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+
R1,e +R2,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y |Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+,
R1,e +R2,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y )− R0 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+


(153)
L˜2 =


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1,
R1,e ≤ [I(X1; Y |X2, Q)− I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y |Q)− R2 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y )− R0 −R2 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q)]+
R2,e = 0


(154)
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(a): Region A(R0, R1, R2) of (R′1, R′2).
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(b): Region B(R0, R1, R2) of (R′1, R′2)
Figure 12: Regions A(R0, R1, R2) and B(R0, R1, R2) of (R′1, R′2)
and
L˜3 =


(R1,e, R2,e) :
R1,e = 0,
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2,
R2,e ≤ [I(X2; Y |X1, Q)− I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y |Q)− R1 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(X1, X2; Y )− R0 −R1 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q)]+


(155)
We first show S˜e(R0, R1, R2) ⊂ S˜ ′e(R0, R1, R2). For a point (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ S˜e(R0, R1, R2), we
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consider the following four cases.
Case 1. If r1,e > 0 and r2,e > 0, then there exits (R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ B(R0, R1, R2), such that
0 < r1,e ≤ R′1 − I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) (156)
and
0 < r2,e ≤ R′2 − I(X2; Y1|X1, Q). (157)
Applying the bounds that (R′1, R
′
2) ∈ B(R0, R1, R2) needs to satisfy to the preceding inequal-
ities, it is clear that (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ L˜1.
Case 2. If r1,e > 0 and r2,e = 0, then it is easy to check that (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ L˜2.
Case 3. If r1,e = 0 and r2,e > 0, then it is easy to check that (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ L˜3.
Case 4. If r1,e = 0 and r2,e = 0, then it is trivially true that (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ S˜ ′e(R0, R1, R2).
We now show that S˜ ′e(R0, R1, R2) ⊂ S˜e(R0, R1, R2). We first show L˜1(R0, R1, R2) ⊂
S˜e(R0, R1, R2). We consider the following four cases.
Case 1. If r1,e > 0 and r2,e = 0, then we let r
′
1 = r1,e+ I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) and r′2 = R2. From
the first three bounds that define L˜1(R0, R1, R2) and (R0, R1, R2) ∈ C˜pMAC , it is easy to check
that (r′1, r
′
2) ∈ B(R0, R1, R2). Hence (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ S˜e(R0, R1, R2).
Case 2. If r1,e = 0 and r2,e > 0, then it can be similarly checked that (r1,e, r2,e) ∈
S˜e(R0, R1, R2) as in Case 1.
Case 3. If r1,e > 0 and r2,e > 0, then let r
′
1 = r1,e + I(X1; Y2|X2, Q) and r′2 = r2,e +
I(X2; Y2|X1, Q). It is easy to check that (r′1, r′2) ∈ B(R0, R1, R2). Hence (r1,e, r2,e) ∈
S˜e(R0, R1, R2).
Case 4. If r1,e = 0 and r2,e = 0, then it is trivially true that (r1,e, r2,e) ∈ S˜e(R0, R1, R2).
Finally, the conditions L˜2(R0, R1, R2) ⊂ S˜e(R0, R1, R2) and L˜2(R0, R1, R2) ⊂ S˜e(R0, R1, R2)
can be similarly shown as in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the capacity-equivocation region of the GMAC with confidential messages.
For the GMAC with one confidential message set, we have derived inner and outer bounds on
the capacity-equivocation region. Although the two bounds only match partially, they are
tight enough to characterize the secrecy capacity region, where confidential messages sent
by user 1 are perfectly hidden from user 2. For the degraded GMAC, we have established
the capacity-equivocation region. We have further derived the capacity-equivocation region
for two examples of degraded GMACs. In particular, we have found that the capacity-
equivocation region of GMACs with confidential messages depends only on the marginal
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channels p(y|x1, x2), p(y1|x1, x2), and p(y2|x1, x2). Based on this observation, we have ob-
tained the capacity-equivocation region for the Gaussian GMAC (not necessarily physically
degraded) with one confidential message set.
We have also obtained an achievable rate-equivocation region (inner bound on the capacity-
equivocation region) for the general case of the GMAC with two confidential message sets.
The region takes a much more complicated form than the case of the GMAC with one
confidential message set. We have further derived an equivalent but explicit form for the
achievable rate-equivocation region. Moreover, we have shown that the achievable rate-
equivocation region for the case of two confidential message sets carries a new feature of a
trade-off between the two equivocation rates corresponding to the two confidential message
sets sent by the two users.
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